I would like to preface my by noting that I wholeheartedly sympathize with the aboriginal people in Canada who have had a long history of marginalization and maltreatment, and thus believe they are fully justified in seeking restorative justice in many areas of life. I am a strong supporter of ‘the idea of cultural claiming’ whereby a particular group can claim unique status and rights based on previous wrongdoings or negligence. What I do not support however, is this particular form of cultural claiming where the aboriginal people groups in
For the purpose of this argument, it is important to delineate between three forms of justice, namely: retroactive, restorative and retributive and apply them to the aboriginal claims at hand. Because of their dark history of marginalization and discrimination, the First Nations groups are seeking amends which I believe they are fully entitled to. However, the improvements they are seeking are based on claims that are a combination of retroactive and retributive justice which I believe is not the appropriate measures for this case. While it is undeniable that the aboriginal people groups in
The term “differentiated citizenship” is in itself, disturbing. The very notion that certain citizens would be given government-sanctioned preference over others goes directly against the concept of equality that is so widely promoted in
Giving the aboriginal groups preferential treatment over other groups in
In addition, granting the aboriginal people special rights and privileges at the expense of other cultural groups is bound to result in a sense of resentment against the aboriginal people by those who think this policy is unjust and unnecessary. This resentment clouds the view of other cultural groups and inhibits their ability to see the aboriginal perspective, recognize their rational claims and understand ways to make appropriate amends for past wrongdoings to the First Nations people. Thus, instead of fostering understanding and a sense of co-operation between various cultural groups, added conflicts between groups may arise as a result of permitting the First Nations to transcend the boundaries that apply to everyone else in
If it were not enough that the very title of the “differentiated citizenship” proposition has faults embedded within it, I also believe the grounds on which this concept is based to be severely flawed.
In addition, as stated by Carens “any satisfactory political arrangement will have to recognize and respect …the differences between First Nations people and non-aboriginal Canadians.” (Carens 2000: 183) I could not agree more, although Carens and I seem to have differing views on what recognition and respect entail. The notion of multiculturalism should acknowledge and celebrate difference but there is no reason to over-accommodate for it as the concept of “differential citizenship” would imply. While I do not believe the aboriginal groups should suffer (as they have in the past) for their unique culture, I also do not believe it is ethical for them to benefit from receiving special consideration. Offering them the freedom of self-government is privileging them above other Canadians based on their cultural difference and is therefore difficult to justify.
Even if the notion of “differentiated citizenship” could be justified, there are a host of logistical issues that would need to be addressed before the self-government could effectively come to fruition. Within the umbrella of the First Nations people there are a number of distinct aboriginal groups which differ greatly from one another in terms of beliefs, cultures and institutions. Thus, in order to effectively and accurately represent these groups “many different ways of institutions aboriginal self-government [would] be required to meet the needs of aboriginal people.” (Carens 2000: 179) This complicates the issue further with the implication that numerous, smaller forms of self-government would be required in order to do justice to the idea of ‘differentiated citizenship’ for the aboriginal people.
In addition, if the aboriginals were in fact granted a system of self-government, it would most likely be funded by the Canadian government. If this was the case, they would still be seen as a sub-group of the main government which would undermine their power, legitimacy and the very essence of having a self-governing body. Since the aboriginal government system would be receiving financial backing there would presumably be some form of oversight on behalf of the Canadian government. Not only would this restrict their freedom and self-determinacy, but it is also likely that the Canadian government would bring their own cultural values and judgments when evaluating the allocation of resources. These values are bound to differ considerably from those of the aboriginal people since this ‘distinct difference’ was the very reason they advocated for a self-governing body in the first place. Carens himself notes that “political and legal institutions are simultaneously cultural institutions in ways that are sometimes invisible to those who share the culture.” (Carens 2000: 189) Hence, it is difficult to imagine that this issue would rectify itself with the introduction of yet another governmental system in light of the aboriginal people’s request for “differentiated citizenship.”
Thus, while I fully believe the historical wrongdoings against the aboriginal people in
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Carens, Joseph. "Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness." (
2 comments:
You have presented an interesting argument that is both intellectual as well as provocative. However, I believe there is a fundamental flaw in your reasoning. The problem lies within the idea that aboriginals’ seeking self government is a form of retributive justice rather than restorative justice. Justice, democracy and equality are ideals that do not escape the prerequisite of contextual circumstances, and a thorough understanding of historical context would reveal that aboriginals are seeking restorative justice.
Firstly, restorative justice implies that there has been some wrongdoing to a person or a community by another party and that by granting some restitution, the afflicted party may be “restored” to their state before the wrongdoing. For example, if someone has assaulted me, through the process of restorative justice, I should be able to claim damages equal to the suffering that has been caused as a result of the assaulter. This is a form of restoring the status of the affected party that was enjoyed previous to the assault. This is where the contextual circumstances play an important role. It must be remembered that historically, the aboriginal people were living in the land previous to the settlement of European colonies. Obviously, since they were the only established people, they had the moral right to self government. Therefore, when the European settlers arrived and forcibly took aboriginal lands, they also took away the aboriginal moral right to self government. It can be said quite simply: aboriginals were here first giving them the moral right to self government, Europeans arrived and forcibly took their lands and imposed citizenship upon the natives, taking away that moral right, and so restorative justice would command that in order to restore justice, the aboriginals should be granted the moral right they possessed to begin with.
Moreover, the concept of citizenship entails that there is a voluntary association with the state. However, history indicates that aboriginal people across Canada did not wish to be Canadian citizens, but rather, it was forcibly imposed. Between 1857 and 1876, only one native person was enfranchised voluntarily under the provided requirement of giving up “Indian status” (Carens 2000). Frustrated by the resistance to citizenship, the government in 1920 made it possible to strip them of their Indian status without their consent (Carens 2000). Therefore, it is clear that aboriginal people did not wish to give up their status, and the moral rights that were associated with it, but were forced into Canadian citizenship. This fact undermines the idea of citizenship and “the concept of equality that is so widely promoted in Canada,” as you have claimed. Without consent, in what way can citizenship be considered equal?
In addition, you have stated that, “it is virtually impossible to correct the historical wrongs of this situation retroactively. No comprehensive set of privileges granted today could ever begin to compensate for the horrendous actions of the Canadian government or early European settlers in the past and it is a wasted effort to even attempt to, using this particular method because it is an inappropriate form of amends.” This is extremely problematic because it implies that past crimes should not be rectified, or that it is a waste of effort to attempt. Moreover, the current Canadian system does not escape the blame of the Canadian forefathers because they have yet to establish the conditions through which aboriginals may be made equal. Mere citizenship does not entail equality because as Carens points out, there is a “denial of basic rights” for aboriginals in education, health care, the economy and the criminal justice system (Carens 2000).
As evidenced, the historical context of forced citizenship and inequality negates the idea that aboriginal self government is a form of retributive justice. Rather, it is a form of restorative justice which restores the moral right they possessed previous to European colonialism.
Bibliography
Carens, Joseph. "Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness." (Oxford, 2000), Chapter 8: 177-199.
This response to “Necessary Accommodation vs. Unnecessary Accession: Drawing the Line” briefly discusses some noteworthy shortcomings of an otherwise well-intended discussion. It does not examine the debate regarding self-governance for aboriginals in Canada. Nor does it deny the possibility that a differentiated citizenship model may not be the most suitable option for aboriginals, whose interests should be our primary (albeit not only) consideration. Instead, the discussion below provides grounds for reconsidering the argument against aboriginal self-governance that has been put forward by the author.
1. Aboriginal oppression is a reality, not just a history.
The author discusses the marginalization of aboriginals in Canada in its historical context without emphasizing its continuing relevance: “While it is undeniable that the aboriginal people in Canada have had a difficult past it is virtually impossible to correct the historical wrongs of this situation retroactively.” It seems worth highlighting that aboriginal oppression did not only happen in the past but also continues to happen today. In contemplating self-governance for aboriginals, it is critical to consider contemporary forms of oppression that have colonial origins.
2. Impossibility of perfect justice does not justify ignorance of injustice.
The author suggests that since it is impossible to provide perfect justice to aboriginals, efforts to rectify historical wrongs are pointless: “No comprehensive set of privileges granted today could ever begin to compensate for the horrendous actions of the Canadian government or early European settlers in the past and it is a wasted effort to even attempt to use [aboriginal self-governance] because it is an inappropriate form of amends.” While the author aptly recognizes the severity of aboriginal oppression, the conclusion above does not follow from its premise. No rational person would dispute that some justice is better than injustice. The impossibility of perfect justice, therefore, cannot be grounds for ignoring the plight of aboriginals.
3. Formal equality is not the same as substantive equality.
Finally, the author is concerned that “preferential treatment” for aboriginals will marginalize other groups in Canada: “The aboriginal people would in effect, be ‘more equal’ than non-aboriginals and it seems absurd to think that one can right a wrong by simply reversing and perpetuating the wrong against a different group of people.” This situation might make sense if we recognize that even with a differentiated citizenship model, aboriginals will not “in effect be ‘more equal’ than non-aboriginals.” This is because not only are aboriginal communities denied equal social status as of now, they also are faced with the consequences of generations of cultural genocide. Significant improvements in the status of aboriginal communities in Canada will likely require several generations of reparations.
The notion that aboriginals will “transcend the status of other cultural groups” is far-fetched. An analytical approach toward determining appropriate accommodation requires understanding the reality of aboriginal lives. Far from being on the brink of national dominance, aboriginals in Canada are struggling for survival. Without an adequate understanding of their condition, we should avoid drawing the line between accommodation and accession too soon.
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