Necessary Accommodation vs. Unnecessary Accession: Drawing the Line

In ‘Citizenship and the Challenge of Aboriginal Self-Government: Is Deep Diversity Desirable?’ Joseph Carens outlines the concept of aboriginal self-government in Canada. Recognizing the unique status of aboriginal people groups and their history of marginalization, Carens outlines a system of “differentiated citizenship” which institutionalizes aboriginal self-government, which I believe encompasses a host of various problems. Through this paper I will demonstrate that “differentiated citizenship” is not the route Canada should take when addressing aboriginal claims.

I would like to preface my by noting that I wholeheartedly sympathize with the aboriginal people in Canada who have had a long history of marginalization and maltreatment, and thus believe they are fully justified in seeking restorative justice in many areas of life. I am a strong supporter of ‘the idea of cultural claiming’ whereby a particular group can claim unique status and rights based on previous wrongdoings or negligence. What I do not support however, is this particular form of cultural claiming where the aboriginal people groups in Canada are seeking retroactive justice by advocating for “differentiated citizenship” which would result in a form of self-government.

For the purpose of this argument, it is important to delineate between three forms of justice, namely: retroactive, restorative and retributive and apply them to the aboriginal claims at hand. Because of their dark history of marginalization and discrimination, the First Nations groups are seeking amends which I believe they are fully entitled to. However, the improvements they are seeking are based on claims that are a combination of retroactive and retributive justice which I believe is not the appropriate measures for this case. While it is undeniable that the aboriginal people groups in Canada have had a difficult past it is virtually impossible to correct the historical wrongs of this situation retroactively. No comprehensive set of privileges granted today could ever begin to compensate for the horrendous actions of the Canadian government or early European settlers in the past and it is a wasted effort to even attempt to, using this particular method because it is an inappropriate form of amends. The aboriginal demands for “differentiated citizenship” and self-government are a form of retributive justice which is difficult to justify as well. Retributive justice calls for the amount of punishment to be proportional to the amount of harm cause by the initial offence. A modified description of retributive justice demands that the amount of punishment must be proportional to the amount of unfair advantage gained by the wrongdoer. The aboriginal claims which seek to elevate their own groups by giving them freedom and privileges not afforded to non-aboriginal groups in the name of justice is a form of retaliation and retributive justice which is simply unethical and unnecessary given the accepted notion that ‘two wrongs do not make a right.’ A more appropriate form of compensation would be restorative justice which would simply seek to establish the rights and freedoms the aboriginal people groups should have been granted historically. Seeking to introduce and institute what the First Nations groups have been entitled to all along is a more appropriate course of action than what I believe they are rallying for with the idea of “differentiated citizenship.” Thus, the knowledge of appropriate amends is crucial when seeking the right form of justice for a given situation since alternative forms can serve to aggravate the situation and cause further problems to ensue.

The term “differentiated citizenship” is in itself, disturbing. The very notion that certain citizens would be given government-sanctioned preference over others goes directly against the concept of equality that is so widely promoted in Canada. The concept of aboriginal self-government conflicts with other fundamental values, such as unified citizenship. Affording the aboriginal peoples privileges that transcend the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms means, in effect, treating them as “citizens plus” (Carens 2000: 187) as outlined in the Hawthorn-Tremblay Report of 1996. The idea that the First Nations groups should have “all the normal entitlements of Canadian citizenship and some distinctive additional ones as well directly related to Indian status,” is an initiative which is difficult to embrace given what we know about Canada’s dedication to equality and anti-discriminatory policies.

Giving the aboriginal groups preferential treatment over other groups in Canada in order to rectify their history of marginalization seems to do little but exacerbate the issue itself. Awarding aboriginals in Canada preferential treatment seems to be an example of over-correcting history, since a valid restorative plan would simply restore the aboriginals the equal status they deserve, not allow them to transcend the status of other cultural groups. In effect, by embracing the notion of “differentiated citizenship” Canada would simply be perpetuating the cycle of marginalization and cultural discrimination and repeating history. By disadvantaging other groups now, in order to grant the aboriginal groups their request for self-governance, the relegation and confinement to a lower class is still present but the roles have simply been reversed so that the aboriginal groups are now being given preference. The aboriginal people would in effect, be ‘more equal’ than non-aboriginals and it seems absurd to think that one can right a wrong by simply reversing and perpetuating the wrong against a different group of people. Moreover, who is to say that the other ethnic groups will not realize their diminished status and then seek the same amends the aboriginals are now claiming within the next century?

In addition, granting the aboriginal people special rights and privileges at the expense of other cultural groups is bound to result in a sense of resentment against the aboriginal people by those who think this policy is unjust and unnecessary. This resentment clouds the view of other cultural groups and inhibits their ability to see the aboriginal perspective, recognize their rational claims and understand ways to make appropriate amends for past wrongdoings to the First Nations people. Thus, instead of fostering understanding and a sense of co-operation between various cultural groups, added conflicts between groups may arise as a result of permitting the First Nations to transcend the boundaries that apply to everyone else in Canada.

If it were not enough that the very title of the “differentiated citizenship” proposition has faults embedded within it, I also believe the grounds on which this concept is based to be severely flawed. Canada is a country which prides itself on its multicultural heritage. One of the fundamental reasons the aboriginal groups believe they should have the right to transcend the Charter is because they are a distinct people group with different sets of institutions, practices and belief systems. This description however, could apply to any one the numerous ethnic groups that now inhabit Canada and is therefore, a weak claim. In the name of equality, if we were to grant the aboriginal people “differential citizenship” based on these ‘unique’ characteristics, we would have to afford the same privileges to all other ethnic groups who ironically also exhibit these ‘unique’ cultural features. Thus, the logic behind this particular reason for aboriginal self-government is rather nonsensical.

In addition, as stated by Carens “any satisfactory political arrangement will have to recognize and respect …the differences between First Nations people and non-aboriginal Canadians.” (Carens 2000: 183) I could not agree more, although Carens and I seem to have differing views on what recognition and respect entail. The notion of multiculturalism should acknowledge and celebrate difference but there is no reason to over-accommodate for it as the concept of “differential citizenship” would imply. While I do not believe the aboriginal groups should suffer (as they have in the past) for their unique culture, I also do not believe it is ethical for them to benefit from receiving special consideration. Offering them the freedom of self-government is privileging them above other Canadians based on their cultural difference and is therefore difficult to justify.

Even if the notion of “differentiated citizenship” could be justified, there are a host of logistical issues that would need to be addressed before the self-government could effectively come to fruition. Within the umbrella of the First Nations people there are a number of distinct aboriginal groups which differ greatly from one another in terms of beliefs, cultures and institutions. Thus, in order to effectively and accurately represent these groups “many different ways of institutions aboriginal self-government [would] be required to meet the needs of aboriginal people.” (Carens 2000: 179) This complicates the issue further with the implication that numerous, smaller forms of self-government would be required in order to do justice to the idea of ‘differentiated citizenship’ for the aboriginal people.

In addition, if the aboriginals were in fact granted a system of self-government, it would most likely be funded by the Canadian government. If this was the case, they would still be seen as a sub-group of the main government which would undermine their power, legitimacy and the very essence of having a self-governing body. Since the aboriginal government system would be receiving financial backing there would presumably be some form of oversight on behalf of the Canadian government. Not only would this restrict their freedom and self-determinacy, but it is also likely that the Canadian government would bring their own cultural values and judgments when evaluating the allocation of resources. These values are bound to differ considerably from those of the aboriginal people since this ‘distinct difference’ was the very reason they advocated for a self-governing body in the first place. Carens himself notes that “political and legal institutions are simultaneously cultural institutions in ways that are sometimes invisible to those who share the culture.” (Carens 2000: 189) Hence, it is difficult to imagine that this issue would rectify itself with the introduction of yet another governmental system in light of the aboriginal people’s request for “differentiated citizenship.”

Thus, while I fully believe the historical wrongdoings against the aboriginal people in Canada were despicable and unjust, I cannot advocate for the system of “differentiated citizenship” that Carens describes for the aforementioned reasons.

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Carens, Joseph. "Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness." (Oxford, 2000), Chapter 8: 177-199.

Aboriginal People in Canada: the idea of cultual relativism

Joseph Carens makes an argument that there are two options for accommodating Aboriginal people: a system of deep diversity in which they are to govern themselves, or a unitary model of Canadian citizenship, in which they are to assimilate and be governed by the same Canadian government as the rest of the minority groups, without exception.

Carens goes on further to assess the flaws and strengths of the two and acknowledges that while each tackle specific problems, it is ultimately an amalgamation of the two polarized options that would ideally provide a culturally sensitive and equitable solution to the Aboriginal people. It is adhering to Taylor’s idea of differentiated citizenship, and Caren’s vision, which is complete self-government of the Aboriginal people, with a sense nonetheless of Canadian citizenship that does allow for unity of them with other minority groups. As previous entries have already pointed out the flaws in such expectations, this will simply assess the presuppositions Carens makes to arrive at such a conclusion.
He gives moral legitimacy to the idea of aboriginal self-government. Previous entries dispute this claim, stating that the right of self government is not necessarily contributing to the idea of equality.

His second assumption is most aboriginal people living in Canada continue to recognize their citizenship of Canada, and to identify a sense of belonging with Canada. He argues further that it is only this sense that needs to be preserved of the unitary model of citizenship. There is a sense he is arguing that to be different, but equal was the method of treating the Aboriginal people. Carens suggests that due to the different value systems of the Aboriginal people compared with other communities, it is therefore necessary to accommodate them by allowing a separate system. However, that said, the different value systems apply to each minority culture, and it would be unjust to tolerate and allow for more differences of one compared to another. His next argument is that the Aboriginal people were first in Canada prior to the immigrants who are now considered Canadians, and therefore they stake a higher claim and should be accommodated thus. This seems to be a fairly arbitrary reason for increased toleration and accommodation, and Carens does make the distinction that independent statehood is not what he is asking, rather a system of implemented self government across and within Canada, regardless of location of the people involved. This would be a great deal more accommodation for the Aboriginal people than compared to what the government does for other minority groups. The assumption that this is appropriate is based upon arguments Carens does not delve into.

Thirdly, he questions the efficacy of an inquiry into the issue by non-aboriginal people. This seems to be a logical fallacy, as arguments are not to be dismissed simply because the origins of them are from specific perspectives, rather they ought to be judged upon the merits and flaws of themselves. For instance, in building the Canadian Charter, the majority opinion was based upon Western philosophical views of rights and justice, and this does not make it less valid to the minority groups, rather it maintains its validity because it affects how others treat and reason their rights in relation to the minorities. There is a broader scope involved, and disqualifying the Western perspective harms as much as a lack of cultural sensitivity towards the group in question. It is in adopting the perspective with cultural relativism that solutions can be sought and differences fostered and upheld.
Furthermore, the idea that differentiated citizenship is necessary brings to question the unity and fairness of the Canadian Charter protecting the rights and freedoms of all Canadian Citizens. It brings to mind a theory of equality that is only superficial, as the spirit of the Charter is argued, by Carens, to be reaching only everyone but the Aboriginal peoples. What good is a universal charter of rights and freedoms that in actuality is not universally applicable to the nation? Dialogue would need to happen, but not to facilitate the separation of Aboriginal rights and courts from others, rather to foster an atmosphere of understanding and mutual respect, that allows ultimately the formation of a universally accepted and mutually agreed upon set of values and beliefs, not imposed, but voluntarily adopted. Whereas Carens sees dialogue to take its role in facilitating separation of the culture, the unity of the people would be better secured in voicing differences and commonalities and taking steps from there towards a united vision of government. Only then is a true, real sense of Canadian citizenship fostered – in an atmosphere of mutual respect and with the safe sense that differences can be worked through as opposed to become points of polarization and separation in kind. There is room for dialogue and cultural relativism, but not one that superimposes one minority's cultural norms upon that of all the others.

One instance of appealing to a sense of equality and justice is the changing language of the Aboriginal people. By addressing themselves as “First Nations”, they emphasise they were on par with the “Founding Fathers” of Canada and therefore to be taken seriously in opinion and rights. This is a fair development as others had previously not taken the Aboriginal people as seriously as they ought to have done. However what need to be brought into consideration as well is the fact that the different groups have played significant roles in shaping Canadian society, as much as, if not more than Aboriginal peoples. There is a sense that although the Aboriginal people were here first, it was the development of trade relations and international cooperation achieved by other groups which further developed Canada for the better as well.

However, the importance of semantics cannot be emphasized enough in the battle for rights and equality. By changing the framework from that of luxury and cultural accommodation to a sense of entitlement deserved by only that of the aboriginal people, they affected public perception and Carens to believe that this was while, enormously complicated and not actually just to other minority groups within Canada, an eventuality that must be achieved in order to attain justice and true adherence of the Canadian citizenship rights of aboriginal people. As Philip K. Dick said: "The basic tool for the manipulation of reality is the manipulation of words. If you can control the meaning of words, you can control the people who must use the words."

Works Cited:

Carens, Joseph. Culture, Citizenship, and Community Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. 177-199

Differentiated Citizenship and Reasonable Accomodation

In Culture, Citizenship, and Community (Chapter 8), Joseph Carens explains that aboriginal peoples do not want to be treated just as equal citizens, but they also want to be self-governing. In order to satisfy the demands of aboriginal peoples, Carens proposes that differentiated citizenship should be granted to them. Differentiated citizenship is a concept that applies the basic assumptions of the unitary model of citizenship (where all citizens are treated equally), but attempts to transcend this model by recognizing and respecting difference in aboriginal peoples. The problem with granting aboriginal peoples differentiated citizenship, however, is that it would require much more than reasonable accommodation on behalf of the Canadian government. To claim a need for differentiated citizenship is to state that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) is inadequate in doing specifically what it has been designed to do—respect difference. Those who argue that Charter does fail to respect difference fail to understand it correctly.

Carens identifies one obstacle to the project of aboriginal self-government, which is the ‘hegemony of the unitary model of citizenship’. This is “the widespread view that any form of differentiated citizenship would be incompatible with the inclusion of aboriginal people in a Canadian political community in which they were full citizens and all citizens were treated equally” (Carens, 177). The principle essentially states that all citizens must be treated equally because any differentiated form of treatment would be incompatible in society. Charles Taylor’s ‘deep diversity’, on the other hand, is “an arrangement in which many aboriginal people would have a self-governing aboriginal community as their primary locus of political identity and participation while still being Canadian citizens” (Carens, 177).

Carens’ ideal vision for differentiated citizenship is a dialogue between aboriginal people and non-aboriginal people over the meaning of justice (Carens, 197). While Carens never goes into detail about how the results of such a dialogue can transcend the unitary model of citizenship (as he previously suggests it should), there is an implication that aboriginal peoples should be treated more than just as ‘equal citizens’, where ‘equal’ can be superficially understood as being in relation to other Canadian citizens. It does not matter whether or not differentiated citizenship is actually plausible because there are many aspects of justice that are implausible, but are still normatively required as a matter of justice. For example, although it is implausible to expect that all citizens are going to be treated equally as a matter of practicality, equal treatment of citizens should be strived for nonetheless.

Some advocates of aboriginal self-government argue that the Charter should not apply to aboriginal peoples mainly because of cultural differences between them and other Canadians (Carens, 189). Aboriginal peoples argue that their culture, practices, and beliefs is what shape their society and make it distinct, thus only aboriginal know the best practices for governing the society. Subjecting them to the Charter would limit their capacity to be self-governing. One obvious response to this claim is, yes, the Charter will limit their capacity to be self-governing. The Charter will be limiting to the extent, however, that the practices of aboriginal peoples will contradict the rights and freedoms of the Charter.
While treating aboriginal peoples with differentiated citizenship does allow them to govern themselves according to their own cultural beliefs and practices, it also suggests that the Charter is relative to certain Canadians. There are two aspects of ‘relative’ that must first be differentiated in order to understand the negative implications of considering the Charter to be relative. First, the Charter that is referred to is the one unique to Canada so it is relative, in this sense, to other countries. The argument for the potential universal applicability of principles in the Charter will not be addressed here since it is not relevant to the general issue. The second sense of the Charter being relative is as follows--if differentiated citizenship is applied to aboriginal peoples then this implies that the Charter is only useful in protecting the rights and freedoms of specific groups of people in Canada.

To allow certain groups of individuals to have privileges that transcend the Charter would promote fragmentation instead of foster respect for difference, where the Charter intends to protect difference. It must be remembered that Carens does not argue that the Charter should not be applied to certain aboriginal peoples. His aim is, rather, to show why this position is a defensible and plausible one (Carens, 192). But if the basis of treating aboriginals with differentiated citizenship means giving them privileges other Canadians do not have, namely, to be self-governing on the basis of vast cultural difference, then this view can neither be defensible nor plausible.

If aboriginal peoples are allowed to be self-governing on the basis of their different set of institutions, practices, and beliefs, then this opens the floodgates of other cultural groups in Canada who either want to be self-governing or want to have certain privileges that pertain directly to their culture that transcend the Charter. One claim that advocates of aboriginal self-government may make against this claim is that aboriginal peoples have unique entitlement to privileges because they were the first peoples (hence ‘First Nations’) to arrive in Canada. Other groups of cultural difference in Canada live there because they have immigrated, whereas aboriginal peoples have always been in Canada. To make this argument, however, would simultaneously permit discrimination on the basis of one’s country of origin.

Another more complex problem to the argument advocating differentiated citizenship and self-governance for aboriginal peoples is the fact that there are many different groups of people that are considered as aboriginal peoples. Each of these groups, naturally, has their own sets of customs. For example, while some groups of aboriginals want to be explicitly self-governing, the Métis would be satisfied with having some aspects of the Canadian Charter applied to them, while also having their own Charter. Questions arise such as—do we let all groups considered as aboriginal peoples to be totally self-governing, should some only be partially self-governing, what about individuals of aboriginal descent who live in major cities; should they also be entitled to differentiated citizenship?

While Carens claims that his ideal for differentiated citizenship is a dialogue between aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples (Carens, 197), his argument contains undertones that more than just a dialogue is required to satisfy the needs of aboriginal peoples. Carens notes that “[p]aradoxically, greater respect for difference is more likely to generate more unity than any attempt to manufacture that unity directly” (Carens, 194). Difference must be acknowledged and respected. The challenge exists in balancing the distinction between respecting difference and fostering fragmentation.

An Equal Society

The belief that all men and women are equal is a fundamental cornerstone on which democratic systems are based. Canada is a respected leader and model for the democratic system and this idea of equality is etched into the heart of every Canadian. Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability” (The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). The word equal is a very powerful word. Equality that permeates throughout an entire society must be kept in a very delicate balance. Although the roles of individuals may vary such as the role of a politician versus the role of an elementary school teacher, the basic rights that subsist in every individual are the same. Laws should not look more favourably upon one individual over another. This is an essential part of equality. Every citizen must be able to protect themselves using a preordained and uniform set of rights and privileges in just the same way as any other citizen. The unique circumstance of the make-up of Canada makes the idea of equality is evermore essential. In a country like ours, one that is made up of diverse multicultural backgrounds, equality is an ideology that pervades our thoughts and is something that has become symbiotic with the identity of a Canadian—one cannot exist without the other.

In our society, an immigrant who has naturalized as a Canadian and a person whose parents were born here and their parents before them, are equals. One does not have any special provisions nor own an edge when it comes to basic rights and laws that govern actions. The idea of equality demands that this be the case, any other approach to this would be counterproductive to the goal of equality. There are many who advocate that the aboriginals of Canada should receive differential treatment from other citizens of this country. The main argument is that because aboriginals chose not to come to Canada but instead were forced to become Canadians, they should be excluded from certain responsibilities, exempt from certain laws of Canada, not mandated to pay taxes, and they should hold different set of rights (Carens 2000). All this was an attempt to respect and accommodate the aboriginal culture. For a long period of time full Canadian citizenship was treated to be incompatible with the distinct identity of an aboriginal.

With respect to the jurisdiction of the Charter of Right and Freedoms, the Charter was meant to be a list of rights for all Canadians regardless of race, age, creed, or gender. It is an all encompassing document that ensures the basic rights of all who have the privilege of calling Canada home. According to Joseph Carens’ article entitled ‘Culture, Citizenship and Community’, Carens states that some aboriginals do not want the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to pertain to their people. Those that advocate for this say that it is not because they do not believe in freedom of religion or expression, rather it is because of cultural differences that the Charter should not apply to them. Some claim that in aboriginal communities, the communal responsibilities should be put before individual rights. However if we were to allow for aboriginals to not be protected under the Charter, it could open the door for major abuses by the government to individuals. A common Charter that lists out all the rights an individual is afforded is necessary to protect citizens and to settle thoughts of inequality and/or preferential treatment for one group of people.

The center point of Carens’ article is that aboriginals are advocating for self-government. Though they would still be in the jurisdiction of Canada, they would handle their business as if they were a country within a country. This concretes the necessity of the Charter to cover aboriginal individuals because if individuals are not protected from the government, exploitation of individuals could ensue. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms unites all citizens of Canada, including aboriginal citizens, under a common citizenship. This kind of solidarity and equality is required for the Charter to be effective and embraced.

The idea of a Charter-less aboriginal self-government will cause a lot of problems in a society that values the idea of equality. If an aboriginal leaves the reserve and joins an urban community then commits a crime, will they not be protected under Charter Rights because the individual as an aboriginal has been denied those rights? What about a non-aboriginal who visits a reserve, commits a crime and then is caught in the act. Will that individual be denied Charter Rights because they committed the crime on aboriginal jurisdiction? There are many issues to consider.

In our previous class it was raised that an aboriginal is different because should they not like the system they do not have a place to move back to. It was further stated that should an African-Canadian not like the system, they should go back to Africa. This is a flawed and racist way of thinking. If an African-Canadian who was born in Canada does not like the system, they should do what they can to change the system here in Canada. The only connection to Africa that person may have is their skin colour. Our world today is an international society and the idea of the global village has been realized. Almost all developed countries do or are beginning to demonstrate a multicultural body and everyday societies are becoming less about skin colour and more about ideologies. If that same African-Canadian did not agree with the ideologies of Canada, yet agreed with that of Switzerland, that person could move there and be content—even though that person previously had no connection to Switzerland. If an aboriginal does not agree with Canadian ideologies and principles, there are many routes that that individual could take.

This is not to say that aboriginals did not have many injustices performed on them during the period of colonialism many generations ago. However since then the Canadian government has done a lot to make peace with the aboriginals. Aboriginals have been given land settlements, monetary settlements, and more to compensate for the wrongful deeds of the past. These settlements have been agreed upon by aboriginal officials and it can be assumed that after these settlements have been given, all is equal and all debts have been paid. The rationale for keeping special provisions in place for aboriginals is no longer necessary because the wrongs of the past have been rectified. These provisions also conflict with the ideology of equality because it creates a two-tiered system in the law where race, skin colour, ancestry, or geography could determine vastly different sentences. Aboriginal youth today, who have been born in the post-confederate Canada, face many problems because aboriginals are seen as different from the rest of us. If they are embraced as one of our own the unique problems that are experienced by aboriginals could dissipate. An aboriginal baby born today in Canada is as Canadian as anyone else. Therefore they should be given the same opportunity to realize their full potential. If a two tiered system is made, that child may be unfairly exposed to the smaller and narrower aboriginal side thus making them feel less Canadian than the rest of society and also make them feel like outcasts of society because they are excluded from something that is considered distinctly Canadian.

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Works Cited:

Carens, Joseph. Culture, Citizenship, and Community Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. 177-199

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Aboriginal People in Canada: Cultural Accomodation vs. Indigenous Identity

Given that our discussion centres on the accommodation practices related to cultural differences in Canada, the topic of Aboriginal self-government seems to be perfectly placed. However, upon reading Carens’ chapter in “Culture, Citizenship and Community” and listening closely to seminar discussions, it becomes evident that perhaps the problem with the entire debate is that it in fact misplaced; it preoccupies itself with proving the constitutional right to Aboriginal self-government and determining the circumstances under which civic integration of Aboriginals will come about in a way that represents the ‘deep diversity’ of the Aboriginal character in Canada. Perhaps due to the fact that Aboriginal presence in Canada was considerable even before Confederation, the discussion is misplaced fundamentally in assuming that Aboriginals are first and foremost, a ‘culture’ per se. For instance, the Chinese, Italians, Portuguese, Greek, Spanish and many others in Canada should be seen as ‘cultures’ that immigrated here from ancestral lands who attempted to leave in search of a better life (i.e. one that involved assimilating into Canada amongst nativist backlash and ‘forming into the mould’ of what was required of a Canadian citizen for acknowledgement and legitimate political representation). If we think of ‘culture’ this way, then accommodation seems to take on a different meaning when it comes to the Aboriginal predicament. They are a people all unto their own in Canada.

The ‘right’ to self-government is a right guaranteed in section 35 of the Canadian constitution and perhaps this is part of the problem. If stating Aboriginal self-government is a 'right' and one that is protected given that it has been written down and formally adopted as part of Canadian policy, the nation has not gotten very far past this point. While, granted, it was a difficult and long journey for even this development to occur, our nation has not gotten very far if all it has done is merely guaranteed Aboriginal self-government. This development (if we can call it one) seems to be the reason why our current discussion centres on how this ‘right’ to Aboriginal self government will come about and to determine the conditions to which it may materialize. But if people are supposed to experience the realization of principles of justice through various concrete institutions, what happens when the background culture is not shared by the people subject to the institutions? This is precisely the point Carens outlines. Not only do the majority of other ‘cultures’ in Canada come from European nations, they all share a common tradition and history that is inherently tied with Western discourse on rights of the individual and liberal democratic theory. Aboriginal traditions, on the other hand, emphasize responsibilities more than rights and the well-being of the collective rather than the claims of the individual (Carens, 191). How can you possibly integrate these two positions?

Carens argues for a version of differentiated citizenship that Charles Taylor has labelled ‘deep diversity,’ “an arrangement in which many aboriginal people would have a self-governing aboriginal community as their primary locus of political identity and participation while still being Canadian citizens. This argument, again, depends on keeping and maintaining Aboriginals in some form of Canadian citizenship. But again, Aboriginals are not like the rest of the cultures that make up Canada’s diverse mosaic, they are people who belonged to this land way before any of us came here and should be seen as unique and separate. The Aboriginal decision to call themselves ‘First Nations’ reflects the Aboriginal appreciation for European politics of language given that they noticed that Western discourse valued the self-determination of nationhood (Carens, 181). If this is the case, doesn’t this clearly suggest to us not only that Aboriginals wish to reinstate their ‘First Nation’ status but that they also want to exist as a separate nation? It may be correct to equate this use of language as a clear sign that Aboriginals are implicitly challenging the myth of the two founding nations but Carens is not correct in assuming this also means that Aboriginals wish so be regarded as equal to the French and English.

Aboriginals perhaps should be seen instead simply as the first inhabitants of this land that do not need to be culturally accommodated but should be let loose and become finally free from the bonds of Canadian imperialism, forced assimilation and in present times, the ‘cuffs’ of Canadian citizenship. The Carens’ chapter seems to offer a lot of evidence to support this claim. Other than the fundamental differences in discourse mentioned above, Aboriginals are different than the many complex and diverse ‘cultures’ that immigrated to Canada from various European lands. These ‘cultures’ immigrated to Canada for various socioeconomic reasons and even though their future generations may become more inclined to view themselves as Canadian, their ancestry is tied to a geographical location and homeland whether it is natal or ancestral. The issues of Aboriginal identity transcend normative cultural tensions with ‘dual identity’ as Aboriginals do not even belong or feel at home in their ancestral land. Aboriginal people in Canada did not choose to be forcibly assimilated, harshly treated, severely separated and then ruthlessly pushed into confined boundaries drawn up by the Europeans or English.

These actions were the ways in which Aboriginals were excluded and included as Canadian citizens and the other ‘cultures’ we speak of today do not share that history of experience. There is a difference between inclusion as citizens by means of forced assimilation and granting citizenship by filling in the requirements necessitated by what the Canadian views to be characteristics or qualities of an ideal citizen. Carens states this in his article as “enfranchisement and full citizenship status were initially provided as a reward for becoming ‘civilized,’ that is, for adopting Euro-Canadian values and practices and repudiating Indian culture and identity” (Carens, 186). Despite this, “few Indians, even among those educated by Euro-Canadians, were willing to trade their Indian status and give up their links to their Indian communities for the sake of full Canadian citizenship” (Carens 186). The ‘cultures’ we speak of today with regards to debates on accommodation do not share this history and choose to immigrate here and participate in the requirements of citizenship. Despite the nativist backlash they initially received upon immigration, they never shared in the degree of coercion and inclusion of Canadian citizenship and the repudiation of their core identity.

Regardless of the unfortunate historical record, the important point is to consider the present situation and find out what the Aboriginal people truly want today. Aboriginal peoples in Canada “want to have standing in international for dealing with the rights of peoples, especially indigenous peoples” and “they want access to these fora to gain recognition and respect on the world stage as distinct cultural communities and political actors” (Carens, 187). If this is so, why must this be done in a way where Aboriginals maintain a primary commitment to the Canadian regime? Because this would provide additional ways of challenging the hegemonic policies of the Canadian government. Thus, “whatever its original motivations, the extension of the franchise and full Canadian citizenship to Indians has been used strategically by the Canadian government to protect itself against challenges from Indians” (Carens, 187). In this way, notions of ‘deep diversity’ and ‘civic integration’ can be seen as further attempts to reconcile Aboriginal identity within Canadian citizenship for the benefit of the Canadian government, not the Aboriginals people.

Carens is correct in seeing the hegemony of the unitary model of citizenship as a serious obstacle to the project of aboriginal self-government. However, the main problem is in assuming that the real issue is how to characterize the Aboriginal character and ‘fit’ them within a form of Canadian citizenship, whether it be unitary or differentiated. Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in Canada do not see themselves as members of the same community and it is for this reason that ideals of civic integration are misplaced. If this is so, the entire attempt to bring this about by means of ‘deep diversity’ and differentiated citizenship is misplaced. It may be quite controversial to state but there may be no real or proper way to treat Aboriginals as equal citizens because they are not equal with respect to other ‘cultures’ in Canada, do not fit within the identity and discourse of Canadian citizenship and never wanted to be Canadian citizens in the first place! This may be different for those Aboriginals fully assimilated, displaced and living in urban areas and experiencing contact with federal governments but this argument is concerned primarily with authentic traditions of Aboriginal collectivities, regardless of their diversity and multiplicity.

We should focus less on creating or forming a version of ‘differentiated citizenship’ that allows for multiplicity and moves beyond the main, valued and unitary model of Canadian citizenship. Perhaps Aboriginal people should be seen as independent peoples given that even the ideals of Canadian citizenship is just as discriminatory as the ideals of forced assimilation in the not so distant past. What we must do is listen to what Aboriginals want and give it to them, albeit with some degree of negotiation and restraint given that claims of historical oppression have the tendency to be used perpetually as arguments for support. As long as Canadians value their contributions, celebrate in their history and respect their customs, this is just as good as forming any ideal of Aboriginal self-government. Our nation is what is has become and there is no way to return back. Whether Aboriginal people wish to fit within the 'mould' of Canadian citizenship and retain their primary committment to the Canadian regime or become recognized as indigenous people entirely to their own, either case should be respected.

References:
Carens, Joseph. "Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness." (Oxford, 2000), Chapter 8: 177-199.

Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. "Federal Policy Guide: Aboriginal Self-Government." http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/pub/sg/plcy_e.html